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Introduction
It is widely acknowledged that antipoverty transfers, including social pensions, children and family subsidies, employment guarantees, and conditional cash transfers make an important contribution to the reduction of poverty. In this paper we focus on human development conditional cash transfers and in particular on the consequences of exclusion from these programmes following recertification. Conditional cash transfers provide income transfers contingent on household investment in human capital, especially schooling and health care (Fiszbein and Schady 2009 ). Stampini and Tornarolli (2012) noted that by 2010 conditional cash transfers reached 135 million people in Latin America, around a quarter of the population. They estimated that the poverty headcount rate would have been 13 percent higher in their absence.
Programme entry is based inter alia on an assessment of the socio-economic status of households. To date, the dominant practice as regards programme exclusion has been to rely on a reassessment of entry conditions, with transfers terminated when participating households report a socio-economic status above the eligibility threshold. This paper studies the impact of exclusion for households previously participating in Familias en Acción, a human development conditional cash transfer programme in Colombia, but found to be ineligible after recertification.
Applying a Regression Discontinuity Design based on welfare scores at recertification, we are able to compare outcomes observed four years after exclusion for households at the margins of eligibility. Outcomes for excluded households are compared with outcomes for households just remaining in the programme. We find that, for households at the margins of eligibility, exclusion it is associated with adverse employment and human capital accumulation outcomes. The findings support the view that applying current exit rules constitutes a counterproductive strategy.
The empirical literature on conditional cash transfers has focused largely on entry conditions, paying scarce attention to exit conditions. A handful of studies have examined exclusion from conditional cash transfer programmes. Gonzáles-Flores et al. (2012) studied programme exclusion in the urban context of Oportunidades while Alvarez et al. (2008) focused on the rural context. They find annual rates of exclusion in urban areas were double those in rural areas (3 percent) and mainly affected households on the margins of eligibility. Around one half of exclusions following recertification were due to changes in households' durable assets, and around one quarter of them was due to measurement errors in eligibility instruments. Another strand of literature focuses on estimating the effects of programmes on ex-participants, compared to never-participants, following exogenous exit. Barham et al. (2013a; 2013b) find that excluded children showed higher human capital levels than never participants, suggesting that truncated participation was better than no participation. To our knowledge, there are no studies identifying empirically the effects of exclusion on excluded households compared to the counterfactual that they remained as participants.
Analytical approaches can help us to predict the effects of exclusion following recertification.
Human development conditional cash transfers are expected to lead to changes in the pattern of consumption, human capital accumulation, and labour supply among beneficiary households.
Rubio-Codina (2010) develops a model of household labour supply identifying household responses to transfer receipt. In the model each household member has total time allocated to non-labour and labour activities. Children's time allocated to schooling has associated costs, such as fees, uniforms, and transport. The transfer is in two parts, as in Familias en Accion: a fixed consumption transfers and a schooling transfer for each child of school age conditional on school attendance. The implication is that the consumption part of the transfer has pure income effect, whereas the schooling transfer has substitution effects in addition to the pure income effect (it reduces the costs of schooling and therefore the relative price of education, while at the same time placing restrictions on the time allocation of children). The substitution effects can be divided into two: the effect of a variation in household members' labour supply in response to a change in their reservation wage, the own substitution effect; and a cross-substitution reflecting the effect of a change in the reservation wage of one family member on all other family members' labour supply. The receipt of transfers therefore triggers a rise in household consumption, an increase in school attendance among children of schooling age, and changes in adults' labour supply in part compensating for potential reductions in child labour and in part responding to a reduction in care from children's increased school attendance.
Our hypothesis is that, for households at the margins of eligibility, exclusion from the programme following recertification effectively reverses the predicted effects from transfer receipt. Exclusion lowers consumption and school attendance. Expected changes in adult labour supply net out potential increases in labour supply in response to the income shock by adults and potential reductions in labour supply associated with childcare. To the extent that mothers provide most of the care for children, reduced school attendance increases their reservation wage, although this effect will depend on the ages of children in their care, particularly whether they are of school age.
In order to identify empirically the impact of exclusion on participant households we estimate a range of outcomes observed in 2011 among households participating in Colombia's Familias en Accion programme in 2006 but excluded following recertification in 2007. Over 64,000 participating households were actually excluded in 2007 because their welfare score known as Sisben, was above the eligibility threshold. Using data for 2011, we observe the impact of exclusion from the programme on a range of household outcomes. Our identification strategy relies of a regression discontinuity design (RDD) with the 2006 Sisben score as the forcing variable. We test the external validity of the RDD by running placebo tests of the outcomes prior to the exclusion of households from the programme and by checking the consistency with RDD estimates at alternative cut-off points. This approach enables us to compare the outcomes for excluded households, at the margins of eligibility, with the likely outcomes had they stayed in the programme.
We focus on three outcomes: adult labour force participation, children schooling, and household welfare scores. These outcomes capture the effects of exclusion on household resource allocation, human capital accumulation, and socio-economic status. Our estimations show that exclusion of households at the margin of eligibility is consistent with a decrease of 1 percentage point in children's school attendance, leading to a cumulative effect of 0.12 years less of education. We also find that exclusion is associated with a 2.4 percentage point decline in female employment and an increase of 1.3 percentage points in male employment mainly in informal work. Three years after exclusion, households are 3.8 percentage points more likely to be eligible for the programme than households remaining in the programme. Excluded households show a 3.7 percentage point higher probability of having children three years of age or younger, that is born after exclusion. Our estimates are robust to different selection of bandwidths, RDD specification and are consistent with different cut-off points around the programme eligibility threshold.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper providing reliable estimates of the consequences of exclusion for affected households following recertification from conditional cash transfer programmes. Our findings are unsurprising in the sense that the effects from exclusion we observe largely reverse the effects associated with transfer receipt. However, our findings have far reaching implications for the design and implementation of conditional cash transfers programmes, and more broadly for antipoverty transfer programmes. Current practice applies entry conditions to assess programme exit. To the extent that our findings from Familias en Accion can be extended to similar programmes elsewhere, they suggest this constitutes a counterproductive strategy. It is counterproductive to exclude households at the margins of eligibility only to find that accumulated human capital is dissipated and gains in economic inclusion are reversed. This paper has six sections. Section 2 describes the programme and the intervention we focus on (the exclusion of households). Section 3 introduces the estimation data. Section 4 presents the RDD approach we use to obtain our estimates. Section 5 presents the estimation results and robustness checks. Section 6 concludes and discusses policy implications.
Familias en Accion and the exclusion of non-poor households
Conditional cash transfer programmes have been introduced in most countries in Latin America and they are emerging in other regions (Barrientos and Villa 2015b; Fiszbein and Schady 2009 In its first phase, the programme was implemented in municipalities with less than 100,000 inhabitants with at least one financial institution. 732 out of the 1,100 Colombian municipalities met these criteria. The selection of households was based on Sisben scores. Sisben is a poverty identification system introduced in 1994. It is based on information from a household survey used to estimate the poverty status of households applying for government support. The survey collects information on the living conditions of the household, provision of running water, waste collection, electricity and sewage, household composition and education endowments. Without warning, support to ineligible households was terminated in 2007. This was in line with legal requirements to restrict transfers to families in extreme poverty and to minimise inclusion errors. We exploit this exogenous source of variation to assess the effects of the exclusion on households at the margins of eligibility with outcomes information available in the Sisben-III.
Data
To estimate the effects of exclusion from the programme, we rely on Sisben survey data with a We are able to observe 2011 outcomes for households participating in the programme in 2006, including households excluded in 2007 and those remaining the programme. Our analysis will focus on labour supply and schooling outcomes providing an insight into household resource allocation and human capital accumulation effects associated with exclusion.
RDD methodology
Following Barrientos and Villa (2015a) and Hahn, Todd, and Klaauw (2001) , we exploit the discontinuities around the eligibility threshold, as a source of exogenous variation, in order to identify a RDD. We apply the optimal bandwidth as derived by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011) , supplemented by alternative bandwidths as robustness checks as described in Calonico et al. (2014a; 2014b) .
Let (1) and (0) be a potential outcome (e.g. school attendance) observed for household if the transfers from Familias en Accion are stopped or if the household continues with the benefits from the programme, respectively. Exit from the programme depends on household obtaining a Sisben score, , greater than the eligibility threshold, ̅ , that is > ̅ . The average treatment effect of the intervention is then given by:
The treatment effect is then estimated non-parametrically by defining an estimand that accounts for the levels of the outcome on each side of the threshold, = + − − , with
The most commonly used estimator for is given by a local polynomial of order also on both sides of the eligibility threshold of the Sisben score:
where ℎ is the bandwidth over which the kernel-based non-linear approach takes place. Instead of choosing an arbitrary bandwidth, we allow a data-driven algorithm following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011) who proposed an optimal bandwidth that minimises the minimum square error (MSE):
where ̂, and ̂, are the estimators of the asymptotic variance and the asymptotic bias of ̂(ℎ ), respectively, and ̂, is introduce to prevent the denominator from being small and start with limited values of the bandwidth. To check the robustness of our estimates, we also run our RDD with the optimal bandwidth proposed by Calonico et al. (2014b) implemented with the Stata's user written command rdrobust which also shows a consistent non-parametric coefficient intervals following specifically for RDD. The distribution of the selected outcomes exhibits continuity in the 2006 Sisben-II data. Table 2 below shows RDD estimates for each selected outcome prior to the exclusion of beneficiaries in 2007 by using Imbens and Kalyanaraman's optimal bandwidth (IK-BW), testing for a placebo effect. The analysis focuses on labour force participation and sectorial affiliation outcomes among adults, on school attendance and completed years of education among children below 18 years of age, and on socio-economic status as measured by Sisben-II scores. Whether workers contribute to a health insurance scheme serves as a proxy for affiliation to formal employment.
As Table 2 below shows that there is no evidence of discontinuity, placebo or anticipation effects on the distribution of the relevant outcome variables at the threshold of eligibility when no ineligible withdrawal was made. None of the estimates is statistically significant. It is also apparent from these results that the RDD is not confounded by selection bias. 
Results and discussion
Tables 3-5 below present our main results. As Gelman and Imbens (2014) note that high order polynomial lead to misleading estimations, we specify our RDD estimates with a local linear regression and check their robustness with a local quadratic linear regression. Here we present estimates based on the Imbens and Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidths. These result tables show the results for schooling, labour force participation, and household socio-economic status and demographics.
Starting with children, schooling estimates provide evidence on the impact of the programme exclusion on human capital accumulation (see Table 3 The estimates on schooling can be interpreted as the loss in human capital accumulation for children excluded from the programme compared to the counterfactual situation had they remained in the programme. The sample of adults includes everyone aged 21 and over, over 2.8 million people (see Table 4 below). For the sample as a whole, the estimated difference in labour force participation in 2011 at the threshold of 2006 eligibility is small and negative but not statistically significant.
Disaggregating by sex shows important differences between males and females. For males, The estimates for whether adults in employment contribute to a health insurance scheme, an indicator of whether jobs are in the formal sector, indicate a lower incidence of contribution status for excluded participants at the margins of eligibility of around 1 percentage point. This is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This estimate is important given the very small share of Familias en Acción participants who are in formal employment at the baseline (Table 4 above shows only 30 percent of heads of household contribute to a health insurance plan).
Disaggregating by sex shows that the lower formal employment effect applies only to males and not to females.
The withdrawal of transfer receipt, equivalent to an exogenous shortfall in unearned income, leads to a rise in participation among males. Considering the labour force participation and sectorial affiliation together, we can speculate that the observed difference in male employment reflects a shortening of job search for males in excluded households. This is consistent with a predicted income effect. For females excluded from the programme, lower participation rates are likely to reflect a net effect from the income shortfall on the one hand and a reduction in school attendance among children of school age and/or reduced capacity to afford childcare for children below school age. Among females, substitution effects appear to dominate income effects. A related literature for high income countries has documented the labour force participation incentives associated with income subsidies complementary to women's employment (Kleven 2014; Kolm and Lazear 2010) . The relevance of these findings for conditional cash transfers in developing countries has been noted (Gahvari and Mattos 2007) Taken together, these results suggest that exclusion from Familias en Acción resulted in negative and significant effects on the allocation of household resources, human capital accumulation, and socio-economic status for some households at the margins of eligibility in 2006.
Robustness checks
Now we turn to the robustness check of our RDD estimates of them main outcomes. We first present a set of results according to a quadratic specification of the RDD following the suggestions by German and Imbens (2014) . We test the robustness of the results presented in Tables 3-5 by looking whether the quadratic estimates are within the estimated confidence intervals according to the robust estimation of the standard errors following Calonico et al. (2014a) . Second, we use an alternate bandwidth estimation proposed by Calonico et al. (2014b) to check the extent to which our results are sensitive to an alternative bandwidth selection. Third, we check the consistency of our estimates by presenting RDD estimates assuming an arbitrary threshold of minus and plus 2 points away from the Sisben-II score eligibility threshold. This arbitrary selection allows us to see whether our results are driven by the detection of spurious estimates around the threshold. Tables 3-5 , in fact an alternative selection of the bandwidth also yields coefficients within the confidence interval. Finally, the estimates of the RDD with 2 points away the Sisben-II score show non-significant coefficients, close to zero, implying that our estimates are consistent at the margins of eligibility of the Familias en Accion programme. In sum, we can confirm that our estimated coefficients in Tables 3-5 are not driven by the RDD specification, the selection of the bandwidth or spurious significant estimates. 
Conclusions
The paper provides reliable estimates of the impact of programme exclusion following recertification on households at the margins of eligibility in Colombia's Familias en Acción.
Relying on a RDD we found that for households at the margins of eligibility in 2007, exclusion effectively reverses gains in human capital accumulation and economic inclusion. Children in households excluded from the programme show lower school attendance and fewer completed years of education when compared with children in households that remained in the programme.
Exclusion also had measurable effects on the allocation of household productive resources. It is associated with a reduction in labour force participation among women, an increase in labour force participation among men, and a reduction in formal employment. Households excluded from the programme in 2007 show lower welfare scores as measured by Sisben scores than households remaining in the programme in 2011, indicating an increase in programme eligibility.
The estimated effects effectively reverse transfer receipt outcomes at the margins of eligibility.
For households at the margins of eligibility in 2006, exclusion results in adverse outcomes on resource allocation, human capital accumulation, and socio-economic status.
These findings are unsurprising when compared with expectations from theory, but they have far reaching implications for programme design and implementation. They suggest that current practice in conditional cash transfer programmes employing entry conditions to assess programme exit is counterproductive. Exclusion has adverse welfare effects on human capital accumulation and economic inclusion for households at the margins of eligibility.
The findings support new thinking on the design and implementation of exit conditions in conditional cash transfers. Agencies implementing conditional cash transfer programmes are paying increasing attention to exit conditions and have adopted a range of strategies to address this issue (Cecchini and Madariaga 2011; Medellín et al. 2015) . Innovations include guaranteeing the receipt of transfers for a specified period of time following changes in socioeconomic conditions of participant households; reduced level of transfers for households exiting programmes but remaining vulnerable to poverty; and strategies to improve the employability of exiting households, sometimes referred to as 'graduation' (Banerjee et al. 2015) . In 2013,
Familias en Acción introduced a guaranteed two years leave to remain in the programme for households with Sisben scores above the entry threshold and up to a vulnerability threshold.
Research on these strategies will throw light on their relative effectiveness. These innovations in programme design and implementation are in line with the findings in the paper. Research into the analytical grounding for these strategies remains an urgent challenge.
